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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE COMPACTS AND AGREEMENTS OF STATES
WITH ONE ANOTHER AND WITH
FOREIGN POWERS
IT is proposed in this paper to consider the meaning and scope
of Section 10, Article I of the federal constitution, which pro-
vides:
"No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera-
tion. . . . No state shall, without the consent of Congress,
. . . enter into any agreement or compact with another state
or with a foreign power."
May a state without the consent of congress first had and ob-
tained make an agreement with another state or country for the
construction of the outlet of a sewer or drainage project within
the borders of such other state? May it contract for the leas-
ing or purchase of ground for the construction of a terminal eleva-
tor or exposition building? May it contract for the transporta-
tion of its products and exhibits over canals which are owned by
neighboring states? May it make a contract for the joint sup-
pression of the spread of a threatened contagious disease, either
among cattle or human beings, or for the joint control of the
vagaries of the I. W. W.s, or for the suppression of the traffic in
intoxicating liquors? What is an agreement or compact? Where-
in does a treaty differ from an agreement, and an agreement from
a compact?
A cursory examination of the section of the constitution cited
and of the original case of Holmes v. Jennison,1 to which we shall
presently refer, would lead one to think that the hands of the• 0
states are absolutely tied and that the states are under congres-
sional tutelage in all matters involving compacts or agreements
not only with foreign nations but in the ordinary incidents of in-
terstate social intercourse.
If, however, the later decisions, or rather the later dicta, of
the courts are to be relied upon, this is not and perhaps should not
be the case.
1 (1840) 14 Pet. 540 (614), 10 L. Ed. 538 (579).
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So far as the supreme court of the nation is concerned, we
have but little more than dicta to guide us in the determination of
these questions, and it is equally strange that at the time of the
adoption of the federal constitution there was little, if any, dis-
cussion of the particular clauses here involved. These clauses
were seemingly lost sight of in the larger question of the pro-
priety of the delegation of the treaty making power to the federal
government, and whether, if delegated at all, it should be exer-
cised by the President alone, or by the President in conjunction
with a majority or other proportion of the senate, or by the
national congress as a whole. The treaty proper, indeed, seems
to have been the topic tinder consideration rather than the com-
pacts and agreements between the several states, and the rela-
tionship of the states with foreign nations rather than between
themselves, with the single exception of interstate commerce.
The comprehensiveness of the broad grant of power to the
president and the senate seems to have been conceded, and the
general opposition to the grant was voiced by Patrick Henry when
he protested that, under the terms of the proposed constitution,
the states "might relinquish and alienate territorial rights and
their most valuable commercial advantages. In short, if anything
should be left, it would be because the president and senate were
pleased to admit it." It will be noticed, however, that neither the
great Virginian nor the critics of the new constitution in gen-
eral seem in any way to have feared that that constitution would
deprive the states of local property rights, interfere with their
social usages, or deprive them of the inherent rights of self-pro-
tection. These dangers perhaps, in the days of a limited immi-
gration, a limited national intercourse, an entire absence of all
general state health regulations and of a scientific knowledge of
the communicability of disease whether to the body or to the mind,
they did not contemplate or consider.
The first case which should be considered is that of New York
v. Miln, 2 for although in this case the interstate commerce prero-
gatives of the federal government rather than its treaty-making
powers were directly involved and discussed, the principles of
local self-government on which many of the later cases hinge
were clearly enunciated.
The question at issue was the right of the state to require, un-
der penalty, the master of every vessel arriving from any foreign
2 (1837) 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. Ed. 648.
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port or from any other state of the United States to make a report
in writing of the name, place of birth, last legal settlement, age,
and occupation of every person on board. This was claimed to
be an interference with interstate commerce. The court, how-
ever, in sustaining the regulation, held the act to be an exercise of
the police power and not in conflict with the constitution as a reg-
ulation of foreign or interstate commerce; that if it were a con-
mercial regulation it would not be an invasion of the power of
congress when tested by the rule laid down by the court in the
case of Gibbons v. Ogden; but the real basis of the decision was
declared to be the reserved power of the states. The court (Bar-
bour, j.), says:
cc * * * We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we
consider impregnable positions. They are these: that a state
has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all per-
sons and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation;
where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the
constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is
not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to
advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to
provide for its general welfare, by any and every act of legisla-
tion, which it may deem to be conducive to these ends; and where
the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its exer-
cise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated.
That all those powers which relate to merely municipal legisla-
tion, or what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police,
are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in
relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified
and exclusive."
The section of the act empowering the New York officials to
remove from the state immigrants deemed liable to become
chargeable upon the city was not before the court in New York
v. Miln.
This decision was handed down in 1837, but three years later,
in 1840, there followed the case of Holmes v. Jennison.' In this
case the question to be decided was whether the state of Ver-
mont could, without the consent of congress, recognize the ex-
tradition proceedings of the Dominion of Canada and extradite
thereunder a fugitive from justice. The court being equally
divided, the writ of error was dismissed and thus the main ques-
tion was not determined. Chief Justice Taney and Justices Mc-
• (1824) 9 Wheat. I (197), 6 L. Ed. 23.
4 Supra, note 1.
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Lean, Story, and Wayne denied the power of the state to enter
into any such relations with a foreign statd as were involved in the
extradition of a fugitive from justice, while Justices Thompson,
Baldwin, Barbour, and Catron for various reasons favored dis-
missal of the bill. The reporter's note states that the judges of
the supreme court of Vermont were satisfied, on an examination
of the opinions delivered by the justices of the Supreme Court,
that by a majority of the Court it was held that the power claimed
to deliver up George Holmes did not exist, and he was accord-
ingly discharged.
Chief Justice Taney in his opinion reaffirmed the doctrine of
the inherent right of self-protection announced in the case of
New York v. Miln and held that the state, without the consent of
congress, undoubtedly could remove any person guilty of or
charged with crime, and might arrest and imprison him in order
to effect this object. This, he held, was a part of the ordinary
police powers of the state which were not surrendered to the gen-
eral government. The state, if it thought proper, in order to de-
ter offenders in other countries from coming within its borders,
might make crimes elsewhere punishable also punishable in its
courts, if the guilty party should be found within its jurisdiction.
In all of these cases the state acts with a view to its own safety
and is in no degree connected with the foreign government in
which the crime was committed and the state does not
co-operate with a foreign government nor hold any in-
tercourse with it when it is merely executing its police
regulations., He, however, held that in the case before him the
situation was otherwise; that in an extradition proceeding the
state acts not with a view to help itself, but to assist another nation
which asks its aid; that the refugee from justice, Holmes, was
not sought to be removed from the state of Vermont as a man
so stained with crimes as to render him unworthy of the hospital-
ity of the state, but was delivered up to the Canadian authorities
as an act of comity to them. This Chief Justice Taney held was
not the exercise of a police power, which operates only on the
internal concerns of a state, and requires no intercourse with a
foreign state in order to carry it into execution; it is the comity
of one nation to another, acting upon the laws of nations and
determining for itself how far it will assist a foreign nation in
5 Supra, note 2.
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bringing to punishment those who have offended against its laws.
Among other things, he said:
"The power to make treaties is given by the constitution in
general terms, without any description of the objects intended
to be embraced by it; and, consequently, it was designed to
include all those subjects, which in the ordinary intercourse
of nations had usually been made subjects of negotiation and
treaty; and which are consistent with the nature of our insti-
tutions, and the distribution of powers between the general and
state governments.
"It being evident, then, that the general government pos-
sesses the power in question, it remains to inquire whether it
has been surrendered by the states. We think it has; and upon
two grounds: (1) According to the express words of the con-
stitution, it is one of the powers that the states are forbidden
to exercise without the consent of congress. (2) It is incom-
patible and inconsistent with the powers conferred on the fed-
eral government.
"The first clause of the tenth section of the first article of
the constitution, among other limitations of state power, de-
clares that 'no state, shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation.' The second clause of the same section, among
other things, declares that no state, without the consent of
congress, shall 'enter into any agreement or compact with an-
other state, or with a foreign power.'
"We have extracted only those parts of the section that are
material to the present inquiry. The section consists of but
two paragraphs, and is employed altogether in restrictions
upon the powers of the states. In the first paragraph, the
limitations are absolute and unconditional; in the second,
the forbidden powers may be exercised with the consent of
congress, and it is in the second paragraph that the restrictions
are found which apply to the case now before us.
"In expounding the constitution of the United States, every
word must have its due force and appropriate meaning; for
it is evident from the whole instrument that no word was un-
necessarily used or needlessly added. The many discussions
which have taken place upon the construction of the constitution,
have proved the correctness of this proposition, and shown the
high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men
who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with
the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been
fully understood. No word in the instrument therefore, can be
rejected as superfluous or unmeaning; and this principle of con-
struction applies with peculiar force to the two clauses of the
tenth section of the first article, of which we are now speaking,
because the whole of this short section is directed to the same
subject; that is to say, it is employed together in enumerating the
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rights surrendered by the states; and this is done with so much
clearness and brevity that we cannot for a moment believe that
a single superfluous word was used, or words which meant merely
the same thing. When, therefore, the second clause declares that
no state shall enter into 'any agreement or compact' with a foreign
power without the assent of Congress, the words 'agreement' and
.compact' cannot be construed as synonymous with one another:
and still less can either of them be held to mean the same thing
with the word 'treaty' in the preceding clause, into which the
states are positively and unconditionally forbidden to enter, and
which even the consent of Congress could not authorize.
"In speaking of the treaty-making power conferred on the
general government, we have already stated our opinion of the
meaning of the words used in the constitution, and the objects in-
tended to be embraced in the power there given. Whatever is
granted to the general government is forbidden to the states, be-
cause the same word is used to describe the power denied to tl Le
latter, which is employed in describing the power conferred on
the former; and it is very clear, therefore, that Vermont could
not have entered into a treaty with England, or the Canadian
government, by which the state agreed to deliver up fugitives
charged with offenses committed in Canada.
"But it may be said that here is no treaty; and, undoubtedly,
in the sense in which that word is generally understood, there
is no treaty between Vermont and Canada. For when we speak
of 'a treaty' we mean an instrument written and executed with
the formalities customary among nations; and as no clause in
the constitution ought to be interpreted differently from the usual
and fair import of the words used, if the decision of this case
depended upon the word above mentioned, we should not be pre-
pared to say that there was any express prohibition of the power
exercised by the state of Vermont.
"But the question does not rest upon the prohibition to enter
into a treaty. In the very next clause of the constitution. the
states are forbidden to enter into any 'agreement' or 'compact'
with a foreign nation; and as these words could not have been
idly or superfluously used by the framers of the constitution,
they cannot be construed to mean the same thing with the word
'treaty.' They evidently mean something more, and were de-
signed to make the prohibition more comprehensive.
"A few extracts from an eminent writer on the laws of na-
tions, showing the manner in which these different words have
been used, and the different meanings sometimes attached to them,
will, perhaps, contribute to explain the reason for using them all
in the constitution, and will prove that the most comprehensive
terms were employed in prohibiting to the States all intercourse
with foreign nations. Vattel, page 192, sec. 152, says: 'A treaty,
in Latin foedus, is a compact made with a view to the public wel-
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fare, by the superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a con-
siderable time.' "
" 'Section 153. The compacts which have temporary matters
for their object, are called agreements, conventions, and pactions.
They are accomplished by one single act, and not by repeated acts.
These con.pacts are perfected in their execution once for all;
treaties receive a successive execution, whose duration equals that
of the treaty.'
"'Section 154. Public treaties can only be made by the
supreme power, by sovereigns who contract in the name of the
state. Thus, conventions made between sovereigns respecting
their own private affairs, and those between a sovereign and a
private person, are not public treaties.'
"'Section 206. The public compacts called conventions, arti-
cles of agreement, etc., when they are made between sovereigns,
differ from treaties only in their object.'
"After reading these extracts, we can be at no loss to com-
prehend the intention of the framers of the constitution in using
all these words, 'treaty', 'compact,' 'agreement.' The word 'agree-
ment' does not necessarily import any direct and express stipu-
lation; nor is it necessarv that it'should be in writing. If there
is a verbal understanding to which both parties have assented,
and upon which both are acting, these terms, 'treaty,' 'agreement,'
'compact,' show that it was the intention of the framers of the
constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms;
and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or com-
mnication betceen a State and a foreign power; and we shall
fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word
'agreement' its most extended signification, and so apply it as to
prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal,
positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the parties.
"Neither is it necessary in order to bring the case within this
prohibition, that the agreement should be for the mutual deliv-
ery of all fugitives from justice, or for a particular class of fugi-
tives. It is sufficient, if there is an agreement to deliver Holmes.
For the prohibition in the constitution applies not only to a con-
tinuing agreement embracing classes of cases, or a succession of
cases, but to any agreement whatever. . .
. . . . It was one of the main objects of the constitution
to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people,
and one nation; and to cut off all communications between for-
eign governments, and the several state authorities. The power
now claimed for the states is utterly incompatible with this evi-
dent intention, and would expose us to one Qf those dangers
against which the framers of the constitution have so anxiously
endeavored to guard."
This case deals with a transaction with a foreign nation. It
does not deal with a contract between the several states. 'It is
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controlled as much by the provision which grants to the president
and two-thirds of the senate the exclusive treaty making power,
as by the prohibition elsewhere contained on the activities of the
several states. It is none the less sweeping and comprehensive
in its terms and it takes the broad position that all matters which
involve a negotiation with a foreign nation come within the treaty
making prerogatives of the general government, and this whether
it be a treaty, a compact, or an agreement, and, if this be so, it
would seem logically to follow that all compacts and agreements
between the several states are also subject to the national 'tutel-
age and require the congressional consent.
At the date of the decision in Holmes v. Jennison,' there be-
ing no extradition treaty with Great Britain, and the president
having disclaimed any authority to surrender up a fugitive to
that government, unless Vermont could do so it could not be done
at all. It could, therefore, with some propriety be asked, with
what federal power does the proposed exercise of authority by
Vermont' conflict? This question was asked by Justice Thomp-
son, who held that it could, at most, be repugnant to a dormant
power which might possibly be brought into action in the future,
by treaty, and too remote for consideration.
The reasoning of Chief Justice Taney in Holives v. Jennison
would seem to apply as clearly to compacts and agreements be-
tween states as between a state and a foreign nation, and to em-
brace literally "every agreement, written or verbal, formal or
informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of the
parties." But without even referring to that opinion, the supreme
court of New Hampshire in 1845, in the case of Dover v. Ports-
mouth Bridge,7 held that there was no violation of the federal
constitution in the erection, pursuant to concurrent legislation by
the states of New Hampshire and Maine, of a bridge over a navi-
gable river, such joint action not being the result of a contract
requiring the consent of congress. The court intimates that the
prohibition embraces only some "league or alliance, or contract of
a political nature," and was "probably not intended to require the
consent of congress to enable states to agree to run the boundary
line between them, or to mark and establish its particular locality,
etc." Says Parker, C. J.:.
"As independent states, New Hampshire and Massachusetts
might have made a compact for the building of a bridge over this
6 Supra, note 1.
7 (1845) 17 N. H. 200.
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river. 12 Peters' Rep. 91, 96. City of Georgetown v. The Alexan-
dria Canal Co. And they might have authorized the erection of
such kind of bridge as they deemed expedient, and have prescribed
the place, terms, and conditions. All the territory above the
navigable waters above or upon any thoroughfare leading to them
belonged to the one or the other of these states, and the inhabi-
tants might have had more than an equivalent for the inconve-
nience of a bridge in the facilities for intercourse and trade which
it furnished. This must have been a matter for the consideration
of the respective legislatures having jurisdiction over the soil and
waters. Whether the inhabitants above received a benefit or not,
they would not have been entitled to compensation for a conse-
quential injury. 8 Cowen 146, 167.
"Prior to the Revolution, the power of the colonies of New
Hampshire and Massachusetts over the soil and waters where this
bridge is situated were subject to the jurisdiction and control of
the mother country. On the declaration of independence, this
control being removed, they might have agreed in relation to the
manner of the use of the waters, or in regard to the closing of the
navigation, or respecting obstructions to it; or they might, by
their separate legislation, have acted upon the subject matter,
without any responsibility for their acts except to each other, and
except, perhaps, that the union of the colonies for their common
defence required them to admit the vessels of the other colonies
when resorting thither for intercourse or shelter from the com-
mon enemy.
"By the articles of confederation, in 1778, each state retained
its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction and right which was not by that confederation ex-
pressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.
The provision that the people of each state should have free in-
gress and egress to and from any other state, and should enjoy
there all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the
same duties, impositions and restrictions, as the inhabitants there-
of respectively, etc., would not have prevented those states from
legislating in such a manner as to obstruct the navigation of the
river, so long as the use of it was as free to the citizens of other
states as to their own. The clause contained in those articles, by
which no two or more states should enter into any treaty, con-
federation or alliance between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, could not have been con-
strued as prohibiting them from authorizing the erection of a
bridge by separate legislation, nor even by direct agreement or
compact. In the language of the court (12 Peters 96), 'They
could, by their joint will, have made any improvement which they
chose, either by canals along the margin of the river, or by bridges
or aqueducts across it, or in any other manner whatsoever.' The
acts of agreement by which they should do this would of course
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not have the character of a treaty, confederation or alliance, with-
in the meaning of the articles of confederation.
"Maine succeeded Massachusetts in her rights to the soil and
waters of this river; and New Hampshire and Maine, by their
several grants, authorized the erection of this bridge.
"Unless the constitution of the United States interposes an ob-
jection, their power to do this has been fully shown. There is in
the constitution no express prohibition upon the states which ren-
ders the erection of bridges over navigable waters within their
jurisdiction unlawful."
The intimation in Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge that "this pro-
hibition applies only to such an 'agreement or compact' as is in
its nature political" is expressly declared to be the law by the
supreme court of Georgia in Union Brand R. Co. v. East Tennes-
see & Georgia R. Co.," involving a railroad constructed under au-
thority granted by the legislatures of Tennessee and Georgia.
Says the court:
"The framers of the constitution clearly intended nothing
more than to prohibit the several states from exercising their
authority in any way which might limit or infringe upon a full
and complete exercise by the general government of the powers
intended to be delegated by the federal constitution. "
The states of Virginia and Tennessee jointly appointed com-
missioners'to survey and fix the boundary line between them, and
subsequently, by legislation enacted in 1803, adopted and ratified
the boundary so ascertained. The validity of this action as con-
cluding the respective states was before the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1893 in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee.
It was held that the mere selection of parties to run and designite
a boundary line imported no agreement to recognize the same,
and that a legislative declaration, following the survey, that it
was correct and that thereafter it should be deemed the true
and established line did not in itself import a contract or agree-
ment with the adjoining state, but at the most was merely an
admission or declaration against interest. When, however, as in
this case, the legislative declaration takes the form of an agree-
ment or compact by reciting some consideration for it, for ex-
ample, as made upon a similar declaration of the border state,
the question arises whether it is such an agreement or compact as
is prohibited by the constitution.
s (1853) 14 Ga. 327.
9 (1893) 148 U. S. 503, 13 S. C. R. 728, 37 L. Ed. 537.
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"The compact or agreement," the court said, "will then be
within the prohibition of the constitution or without it, according
as the establishment of the boundary line may lead or not to the
increase of the political power or influence of the states affected,
and thus encroach or not upon the full and free exercise of fed-
eral authority. If the boundary established is so run as to cut
off an important and valuable portion of a state, the political
power of the state enlarged would be affected by the settlement
of the boundary; and to an agreement for the running of such a
boundary or rather for its adoption afterwards, the consent of
congress may well be required. But the running of a boundary
may have no effect upon the political influence of either state; it
may simply serve to mark and define that which actually existed
before, but was undefined and unmarked. In that case the agree-
ment for the running of the line, or its actual survey, would in
no respect displace the relation of either of the states to the gen-
eral government. There was, therefor, no compact or agree-
ment between the states in this case which required, for its valid-
ity, the consent of congress, within the meaning of the constitu-
tion, until they had passed upon the report of the commissioners,
ratified their action, and mutually declared the boundary estab-
lished bv them to be the true and real'boundary between the
states. Such ratification was mutually made by each state in con-
sideration of the ratification of the other."
The opinion contains also the following remarkable dictum
which has leavened the whole mass of constitutional construction:
"There are many matters upon which different 8tates may
agree that can in no respect concern the United States. If, for
instance, Virginia should come into possession and ownership of
a small parcel of land in New York which the latter state might
desire to acquire as a site for a public building, it would hardly be
deemed essential for the latter state to obtain the consent of Con-
gress before it could make a valid agreement with Virginia for
the purchase of the land. If Massachusetts, in forwarding its
exhibits to the World's Fair at Chicago, should desire to trans-
port them a part of the distance over the Erie Canal, it would
hardly be deemed essential for that state to obtain the consent of
Congress before it could contract with New York for the trans-
portation of the exhibit through that state in that way. If the
bordering line of two states should cross some malarious and
disease producing district, there could be no possible reason, on
any conceivable public grounds, to obtain the consent of Con-
gress for the bordering states to -agree to unite in draining the
district, and thus remove the cause of disease. So in case of
threatened invasion of cholera, plague, or other causes of sick-
ness and death, it would be the height of absurdity to hold that
the threatened states could not unite in providing means to prevent
and repel the invasion of the pestilence without obtaining the
consent of Congress, which might not be at the time in session.
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If, then, the terms 'compact' or 'agreement' in the constitution
do not apply to every possible compact or agreement between one
state and another, for the validity of which the consent of Con-
gress must be obtained, to what compacts or agreements does the
constitution apply ?"
Although the above is dictum merely, the reasoning which
accompanies it and which was applicable to the question under
consideration, as well as to the dictum, is full of significance and
fully supports the theory that it is only in things political that
congress has exclusive and original jurisdiction. The doctrine
of ,noscitur a sociis is relied upon and the argument is made
that the words "treaty," "compact," and "agreement" merely take
the place of the words "confederation," "agreement," "alliance,"
and "treaty," which are to be found in Article 6 of the articles of
confederation, and of the provision that "no two or more states
shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever be-
tween them," which are contained in the same articles. These
two clauses are as follows:
"Article VI. No state without the consent of the United
States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive
any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance or treaty with any king, prince or state, nor shall any
person holding any office of profit or trust under the United
States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office
or title of any kind whatever from any king, prince or foreign
state; nor shall the United States in congress assembled, or any of
them, grant any title of nobility."
"No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confedera-
tion or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the
purpose for which the same is to be entered into, and how long
it shall continue."
In the case of McCready v. Virginia0 the Supreme Court' of
the United States held that each state owns the beds of all tide-
waters within its jurisdiction and may appropriate them, to be
used by its citizens as a common for taking and cultivating fish,
and a law of Virginia prohibiting non-citizens of the state from
planting oysters in the soil covered by her tide-waters is valid;
and in Wharton v. Wise" the validity of a compact between Vir-
ginia and Maryland was involved, which gave to the citizens of
Maryland the privilege of taking oysters within the waters of the
10 (1877) 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. Ed. 248.
21 (1894) 153 U. S. 155, 14 S. C. R. 787, 3 L. Ed. 674.
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former state. The question, therefore, was whether a state by
agreement with another state, and without the consent of congress,
could give to the citizens of the favored state privileges which it
did not accord to those of other states. The court pointed out
that this agreement had been made under the articles of confed-
eration and was not antagonistic to these articles. It held it was
"not a treaty, confederation, or alliance," within the meaning of
those terms as they are used; it remained as a subsisting, operat-
ing contract between them in full force when the confederation
went out of existence upon the adoption of the present constitu-
tion of the United States, and it was not affected or set agide
by the prohibitory clauses of that instrument. It is a prohibition
that extends only to future agreements or compacts, not against
those already in existence, except so far as their stipulations might
affect subjects placed under the control of congress, such as com-
merce and the navigation of public waters, which is included un-
der the power to regulate commerce.
By way of dictum, however, it cited with approval the lan-
guage which we have before quoted from the case of Virginia v.
Tennessee, 2 and applied this language to the articles of confedera-
tion. It did not, as it might have done, point out the fact that the
articles of confederation merely prohibited "any conference.
agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or state," and
provided that "no two or more states shall enter into any treaty,
confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the con-
sent of congress." It might have held, and plausibly, that the
word "state," as used in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the
articles of confederation, merely applied to foreign states, and
that the word "agreement" therein used was an agreement in the
nature of a treaty. It might have pointed out, as it did not, that
it merely forbade two states from entering into "any treaty con-
federation, or alliance, without the consent of congress;" that
the words "treaty, confederation, alliance" clearly characterized
transactions of a political character, which affected sovereignty;
and that, on the other hand, Section 10 of Article I of the federal
constitution prohibits any "agreement or compact."
The supreme court of Louisiana, in the case of Fisher v.
Steele,3 in 1887, sustained a contract between that state and Ark-
ansas for the construction of a levee along the Mississippi River in
Arkansas, against the objection that it was in conflict with Sec-
12 Supra, note 9.
13 (1887) 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882.
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tion 10 of Article I of the constitution, treating the contention of
invalidity somewhat scornfully:
"On reading that objection in connection with the constitu-
tional prohibition just quoted, the mind would naturally expect
a charge that the state of Louisiana was projecting a treaty of
alliance with the state of Arkansas, or contemplating some joint
scheme of commercial or industrial enterprise, or perhaps con-
spiring for the establishment of a new confederacy.; but great is
the relief when the mind is informed that the purpose which
plaintiff resists with such a powerful shield is merely to build a
piece of levee in the state of Arkansas, if necessary, and if that
state does not object, or consents. It is, indeed, too clear for
argument that such a transaction is no more a prohibited com-
pact between two states than is contained in the requisition of
one governor for, and the consent of another' to, the capture and
arrest of a fugitive from justice."
To the opinions expressed in the foregoing cases may be
added the dictum of Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Balti-
more :14
"It is worthy of remark too that these inhibitions generally
restrain state legislation on subjects intrusted to the general gov-
ernment, or in which the people of all the states feel an interest.
A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confed-
eration. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they inter-
fere with the treaty-making power, which is conferred entirely on
the general government; if with each other, for political pur-
poses, they can scarcely fail to interfere with the general pur-
pose and intent of the constitution."
On the other hand, Story, writing about the year 1833,15 com-
menting on the two clauses under consideration before any of the
cases above mentioned were decided, says:
"Sec. 1403. Perhaps the language of the former clause may
be more plausibly interpreted from the terms used, 'treaty, alli-
ance, or confederation,' and upon the ground, that the sense of
each is best known by its association (noscitur a sociis) to apply
to treaties of a political character; such as treaties of alliance for
purposes of peace and war; and treaties of confederation, in
which the parties are leagued for mutual government, political co-
operation, and the exercise of political sovereignty; and treaties
of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdic-
tion, or external political dependence, or general commercial privi-
leges. The latter clause 'compacts and agreements,' might then
very properly apply to such as regarded what might be deemed
mere private rights of sovereignty; such as questions of boundary;
14 (1833) 7 Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672.
15 Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, Sec. 1403.
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interests in land situate in the territory of each other; and other
internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience of
states bordering on each other. Such compacts have been made
since the adoption of the constitution. The compact between
Virginia and Kentucky, already alluded to, is of this number.
Compacts, settling the boundaries between states, are, or may
be, of the same character. In such cases, the consent of Con-
gress may be properly required, in order to check any infringe-
ment of the rights of the national government; and, at the same
time, a total prohibition to enter into any compact or agreement
might be attended with permanent inconvenience or public nis-
chief."
If we consider the history of these constitutional provisions
together with the otheir provisions of the constitution which grant
or limit authority, we are led to conclude that only political com-
pacts or agreements which affected their sovereignty as between
themselves or between them and the federal government were
sought to be regulated or controlled.
We realize that the support to be found for this proposition
in the federal cases is largely dicta, yet such dicta have been of
long standing and, so far as we can learn, have never 'been judi-
cially criticized. We realize also the difficulty of determining in
every particular case whether the sovereignty of the state is en-
larged or that of the federal government encroached upon. It
seems clear, however, that where a state obtains permission to drain
its surface waters within the borders of another state or nation, as
was the situation in the case of ilMcHenrv County v. Brady,5 or
seeks to purchase a site for an exposition or other public build-
ing, or to do things mentioned by Mr. Justice Field in the dic-
tum in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee, such a state is in no way
increasing its political power or encroaching upon that of the
nation. Though the transaction may involve a negotiation and
perhaps an agreement or compact, it is an exercise of a corporate
and property-owning rather than a governmental power. It is
true that in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee the Supreme Court
16 (N.D. 1917) 163 N. W. 540. An agreement was entered into be-
tween the drainage boards of certain counties in North Dakota and a
municipality in the province of Manitoba for the improvement of Mouse
River, which flows from North Dakota into Canada, in order to facilitate
the drainage of certain lands by securing an outlet for surface waters.
The contract was made under the authority of the state of North Dakota
and contemplated the expenditure of money and the performance of work
in the territory of a foreign country. It was attacked as being an "agree-
ment" or "compact" with a foreign power, prohibited by the constitu-
tion. Held, (Bruce, C. J.) an agreement not in any way calculated to
encroach upon or weaken the authority of congress, not political in its
character, and therefore not within the constitutional prohibition.-Ed.
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of the United States drew a careful distinction between an agree-
ment for the survey of a boundary line and an agreement which
would make that line controlling. Permanently locating a bound-
ary line, however, would place the persons on either side of it
either within or without the jurisdiction of the particular state
and would increase or decrease its sovereignty and often that of
the national government itself.
17
17 On April 1, 1918, congress gave its consent to a compact and agree-
ment between the states of Oregon and Washington regarding concur-
rent jurisdiction over the waters of the Columbia River and its tributaries,
in connection with regulating, protecting, and preserving the fisheries in
the river. Cong. Record, 1918, p. 4730.
Following is a list of agreements between states to which the consent
of congress has been given:
ACTS OF CONGRESS GIVING CONSENT TO AGREEEMENTS BETWEEN STATES.
Resolution of May 12, 1820 (3 Stat., 609). Kentucky and Tennessee,
February 2, 1820. Boundary line.
Act of June 28, 1834 (4 Stat., 708). New York and New Jersey, Sep-
tenber 16, 1833. Boundary line, execution of process, etc.
Act of January 3, 1855 (10 Stat. 602). Massachusetts and New York,
May 14 and July 21, 1853. Cession of district of Boston Corner by. Mass-
achusetts to New York:
Act of February 9, 1859 (11 Stat., 382). Massachusetts and Rhode
Island. Attorney General directed to assent to agreement between States
in adjustment of boundary dispute before Supreme Court.
Joint resolution of February 21, 1861 (12 Stat., 250). Arkansas, Louis-
iana, and Texas. Joint action for removal of raft. from Red River (past
or prospective agreements).
Joint resolution of March 10, 1866 (14 Stat., 350). Virginia and West
Virginia. Cession of Berkeley and Jefferson Counties to W.est Virginia.Act of March 3, 1879 (20 Stat., 481). Virginia and Maryland, January
16, 1877. Boundary line.
Act of April 7, 1880 (21 Stat., 72). New York and Vermont, Novem-
ber 27, 1876, and March 20, 1879. Boundary line.
Act of February 26, 1881 (21 Stat., 351). New York and Connecti-
cut, December 8, 1879. Boundary line.
Act of October 12, 1888 (25 Stat., 553). Connecticut and Rhode Island,
May 25, 1887. Boundary line.
Act of August 19, 1899 (26 Stat., 329). New York and Pennsylvania,
March 26, 1886. Boundary line.
Act of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat., 214). South Dakota and Nebraska,
June 3 and 7, 1897. Boundary line.
Joint resolution of March 3, 1901 (31 Stat., 1465). Tennessee and
Virginia, January 28 and February 9. 1901. Boundary line.
Act of March 1, 1905 '(33 Stat., 820). South Dakota and Nebraska.
Boundary line.
Act of January 24, 1907 (34 Stat. 858). New Jersey and Delaware,
March 21, 1905. Jurisdiction over Delaware River, process, etc.
Joint resolution of January 26. 1909 (35 Stat.. 1160). Mississippi
and Louisiana. Boundary line and criminal jurisdiction (prospective
agreement).
Joint resolution of January 26, 1909 (35 Stat., 1161). Mississippi and
Arkansas. Boundary line and criminal jurisdiction (prospective agree-
ment).
Joint resolution of February 4. 1909 (35 Stat., 1163). Tennessee and
Arkansas. Boundary line and criminal jurisdiction (prospective agree-
ment).
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Perhaps the true rule is that all compacts or agreements which
increase or decrease political power are void, but that all others
are voidable merely, at the option of the national government,
and that a consent thereto may be inferred from silence and
acquiescence.
ANDREW A. BRUCE.*
BISMARCK, NORTH DAKOTA.
* Chief Justice, Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Joint resolution in June 7, 1910 (36 Stat., 881). Missouri and Kan-
sas. Boundary line and criminal jurisdiction (prospective agreement).
Joint resolution of June 10, 1910 (36 Stat., 881). Oregon and Wash-
ington. Boundary line (prospective agreement).
Joint resolution of June 22, 1910 (36 Stat., 882). Wisconsin, Illinois,
Indiana, and Michigan. Criminal jurisdiction on Lake Michigan (pros-
pective agreement).
Act of October 3, 1914 (38 Stat., 727). Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut, March 19, 1908, and June 6, 1913. Boundary line.-Cong. Record, 1918,
p. 4731.
